Beyond the Abraham Accords: The Real Drivers of the Saudi-Pakistan Defense Pact

The recently announced Saudi-Pakistan “Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement” is far more than a routine extension of long-standing cooperation between the two countries. Signed in September 2025, the pact commits both nations to treat an attack on one as an attack on both, formalizing a deep military partnership. But beneath the formal language lies a political reality that ties this agreement directly to U.S. strategic objectives—specifically, support for Saudi Arabia as it prepares for potential domestic unrest tied to normalization with Israel under the Abraham Accords.

Contrary to arguments that the pact is simply a Saudi attempt to diversify away from Washington, available evidence suggests the agreement moved forward with U.S. approval, even encouragement. For the Trump administration, reviving the Abraham Accords has become a central foreign policy goal, one aimed at casting Trump as a peacemaker in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia is the linchpin in this process: normalization between Riyadh and Tel Aviv would amount to a historic breakthrough. Yet such a step risks triggering significant domestic backlash inside the kingdom. The pact with Pakistan—home to the Muslim world’s only nuclear arsenal and a battle-hardened military—serves as a safety valve for Riyadh, ensuring external reinforcement if its own forces falter in containing dissent.

For Pakistan, the timing is equally critical. Army Chief General Asim Munir, whose extended tenure runs until 2027, and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s government both face deep unpopularity and domestic fragility. A warm welcome in Washington offers not just economic incentives, such as promises of mineral deals, but also political legitimacy at home. For Munir in particular, U.S. support strengthens his standing within Pakistan’s armed forces and political elite. The defense pact with Saudi Arabia, framed as a sign of Islamabad’s strategic indispensability, provides both international recognition and internal leverage.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030 further explains the urgency. Economic diversification and social transformation require stability. Normalization with Israel may be framed as part of that long-term vision, but the immediate priority is securing the regime against unrest. The pact with Pakistan ensures an added layer of security, reinforcing the ruling family’s confidence as it prepares for potentially controversial steps. In parallel, Riyadh has also pursued rapprochement with Iran, highlighting a broader strategy of hedging and balance—yet always with an eye on Washington’s priorities.

The U.S., then, is not a passive bystander. While analysts often describe Washington’s role as one of “buck-passing,” encouraging regional allies to take on more of their own security burdens, the Saudi-Pakistan pact fits neatly into Trump’s short-term agenda: securing Muslim-world support for the Abraham Accords and reshaping the narrative around Gaza. By aligning Saudi Arabia and Pakistan with this project, Washington ensures that two of the most influential Muslim-majority states are at least tacitly on board.

Still, challenges loom. Public opinion in both countries remains staunchly pro-Palestinian and deeply hostile to normalization with Israel. Any overt steps toward the Abraham Accords risk inflaming unrest, precisely the threat that this defense pact is designed to contain. Moreover, other Muslim nations will be closely watching Riyadh’s next moves, with potential ripple effects across the region.

In essence, the Saudi-Pakistan defense pact is less about regional autonomy and more about strategic coordination under U.S. auspices. It shores up Saudi Arabia’s capacity to manage internal dissent, gives Pakistan much-needed political validation, and supports Trump’s ambitions to revive the Abraham Accords. Far from representing independence from Washington, the pact underscores just how central U.S. approval remains—and how intertwined the domestic vulnerabilities of Riyadh and Islamabad are with America’s Middle East agenda.