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Pakistan’s Border Gamble: Can Hard Security Alone Contain the TTP?
This in-depth analysis explores Pakistan’s evolving border security strategy with Afghanistan following the Taliban’s 2021 takeover. It examines the resurgence of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the limits of Islamabad’s hard-security measures, and the policy gaps exposed by Kabul’s reluctance to act. The piece highlights recent attacks, cross-border tensions, and offers forward-looking recommendations on diplomacy, smart border management, and socio-economic inclusion.
Nimra Researcher CSD Islamabad
9/22/20253 min read
A volatile frontier
Four years after the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul, Pakistan’s western border is under severe strain. Militancy linked to Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has surged. According to the Global Terrorism Index 2025, attacks attributed to the group rose from 182 in 2023 to 462 in 2024—a 2.5-fold increase—with fatalities more than doubling. The sharp escalation has left Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan, and the merged tribal districts reeling from ambushes, bombings, and targeted strikes. Islamabad’s security establishment has responded with fencing, cross-border raids, and intelligence-based operations. Yet the Afghan Taliban, despite repeated assurances, has neither dismantled TTP sanctuaries nor disarmed its leaders.
A border with a long memory
The Durand Line, drawn in 1893, remains the bedrock of discord. Afghanistan has never formally recognized it, citing the division of Pashtun and Baloch communities. Pakistan insists the frontier is legally binding, backed by colonial treaties and post-independence practice. Since Pakistan’s birth in 1947, Afghan leaders have periodically pressed the 'Pashtunistan' cause, even voting against Pakistan’s admission to the UN. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 made the borderlands a Cold War battlefield, with Pakistan hosting mujahideen fighters—some of whom would later form the Taliban. After 2001, Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters retreated into Pakistan’s tribal belt. Crackdowns and Pakistan’s alliance with the U.S. helped trigger the emergence of the TTP in 2007.
The post-2021 resurgence
The Taliban’s August 2021 takeover in Kabul emboldened the TTP. Ideologically close to the Afghan Taliban but focused on Pakistan, the group has demonstrated resilience and adaptability: • High-profile strikes: The Bisham suicide bombing in March 2024 killed five Chinese engineers, disrupting a CPEC project. • Persistent raids: Security convoys, police posts, and development projects have come under attack, eroding public trust. • Taliban’s reluctance: Despite intelligence sharing, Kabul has done little to constrain the TTP, citing tribal bonds and ideological affinities.
Provinces under siege
KP, Balochistan, and the former tribal districts have borne the brunt of renewed militancy. These areas, marked by underdevelopment and weak governance, provide fertile ground for recruitment. The Durand Line itself has become a modern flashpoint: firefights have erupted over fencing, checkpoints, and sovereignty disputes, underscoring how historical tensions have re-emerged as present-day crises.
Islamabad’s toolkit: fences, strikes, deportations
• Border fencing: Since 2017, Pakistan has fenced most of the 2,640-km frontier. The barrier has raised costs for militants but not sealed remote passes. • Cross-border strikes: Drone and artillery
strikes have targeted TTP hideouts in Afghanistan, but such operations carry diplomatic risks. • IBOs: Intelligence-based operations have disrupted cells in KP and Balochistan but cannot eliminate sanctuaries across the border. • Refugee crackdown: The 2023 'Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan' forced thousands of undocumented Afghans to leave. Supporters saw a security dividend; critics warned it risked alienating Afghan communities.
Diplomatic dead ends
Islamabad initially viewed the Taliban’s victory as an opportunity to replace a hostile Kabul regime with a friendly one. Instead, the Taliban has resisted acting against the TTP. Bilateral talks have stalled, and Kabul’s growing outreach to India has only heightened Pakistan’s anxieties.
Policy gaps exposed
• Over-militarization: Heavy reliance on fencing and kinetic operations has not produced sustainable results. • Civil-military imbalance: Counterterrorism remains dominated by the army, sidelining police and civilian law enforcement. • Neglected borderlands: Socio-economic marginalization in KP and Balochistan fuels discontent. • Fragmented diplomacy: Islamabad lacks a multilateral consensus to pressure Kabul effectively.
What could move the needle
1. Structured dialogue: Institutionalize talks with the Taliban tied to measurable counterterrorism commitments.
2. Regional diplomacy: Engage China, Iran, and Central Asian states to apply collective pressure.
3. Strengthen civilian CT capacity: Empower provincial police and intelligence agencies with resources and training.
4. Invest in frontier communities: Education, infrastructure, and governance to undermine militant recruitment.
5. Smart border technologies: Biometric checkpoints, drones, AI-driven monitoring. 6. Doctrinal shift: Abandon the outdated 'strategic depth' model in favor of regional stability.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s western frontier remains a proving ground where history, militancy, and geopolitics collide. The TTP’s resurgence underscores the limits of a hard-security-heavy approach. Unless Pakistan can balance force with diplomacy and development—and unless Kabul curbs TTP sanctuaries—the Durand Line will remain more fault line than frontier.
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